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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-613 allows a person who is dissatisfied by a
decision of the Utah State Retirement Board ("Board") to "obtain judicial review
by complying with the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act.95
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16 confers jurisdiction on the Supreme Court or
Court of Appeals to review all final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative hearings. Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(a) and Rule 14 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure confer jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals over the
final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the Board correctly apply the plain language of U.C.A.§49-11401(3)(c) and (e) which mandate that a retirement system member
cannot receive more than one year of service credit for one year of
actual work?

2.

Did the Board correctly determine that under U.C.A.§49-1 l-403(l)(d)
Petitioner cannot purchase service credit because he has no forfeited
service credit?

3.

Did the Board correctly deny Petitioner's claim of equitable estoppel
against the Board as a government agency because he failed to show an
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unusual circumstance or that he reasonably relied on the Board's
statements to his detriment?
4.

Were the Board's Findings of Fact sufficient to support its conclusion of
law that Petitioner failed to prove an estoppel against the Board?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-16(4) specifically enumerates the relief which this Court may grant on an
appeal from a formal administrative hearing before the Board. Utah Code Ann.
§63-46b-16(4) states:
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by one of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the
agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as
applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by
any statute;
(c)
the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring
resolution;
(d)
the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e)
the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or
decision-making process, or has failed to follow
prescribed procedure;
(f)
the persons taking the agency action were illegally
constituted as a decision-making body or were subject to
disqualification;
(g)
the agency action is based upon a determination of fact,
made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court;
(h)
the agency action is:
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(i)

an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by
statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the
agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and
reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for
the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capriciousi
Norman O. Whitaker ("Petitioner") failed to point to any specific
subsection for relief under Section 63-46b-16(4) where the Board erred. In a
recent case involving the Utah State Retirement Board (the "Board") before the
Court of Appeals the petitioner was admonished for not properly characterizing
his claims under Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4). See, Terrv v. Retirement Board,
2007 UT App 87. The Utah Court of Appeals has duly noted that because the
standard of review under Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA") will vary
based on the subsection the claim is brought under, "we strongly encourage
[future]counsel to clearly identify under what section review is being sought and
to make certain they identify the appropriate standard of review under that
section." Id. at ^f 6, quoting, King v. Industrial Com 'n of Utah, 850 P.2d
1281,1287 n.7 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Petitioner does allege in his brief what he believes to be the appropriate
standards of review. See, Petitioner's Brief at 2-4. However, Petitioner
mistakenly alleges that the Board erred in its interpretation and application of Utah
Code Ann. §49-11-401 and the applicable standard of review is a correction of
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error with no deference to the Board's decision because it involves a legal issue.
See, Petitioner's Brief at 2.
Contrary to Petitioner's position, the Utah Supreme Court has held an
appellate court should grant deference to an agency's interpretation or application
of law when "there is a grant of discretion to the agency concerning the language
in question, either expressly made in the statute or implied from the statutory
language." Morton Int'L, Inc. v. State Tax Comm % 814 P.2d 581, 589 (Utah
1991). "Where a grant exists, [the appellate court] will not disturb the agency's
interpretation or application of the law unless its determination exceeds the bounds
of reasonableness and rationality." King v. Industrial Comm 'n of Utah, 850 P.2d
1281, 1286 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Thus, if the Board has been granted discretion,
either expressly or impliedly, to interpret or define the statutory language at issue,
the Court will not disturb the Board's interpretation unless it exceeds the "bounds
of reasonableness and rationality." Id.
Petitioner's position that the Board's interpretation and application of Utah
Code Ann. §49-11-401 be given no deference directly conflicts with the statutory
provision granting the Board such discretion. Utah Code Ann. §49-11-401(c) &
(e) states concerning the Board's powers and duties related to granting service
credit:
(c) The board shall fix the minimum time per day, per month, and
per year upon the basis of which one year of service and
proportionate parts of a year shall be credited toward
qualification for retirement. Service may be computed on a
fiscal or calendar year basis and portions of years served shall
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be accumulated and counted as service. In any event, all of the
service rendered in any one fiscal or calendar year may not
count for more than one year,
(e) A member may not accrue more than one year of service
credit per fiscal or calendar year as determined by the office.
(Emphasis added.)
This statute grants the Board and the Retirement Office with the express discretion
to determine eligibility and computation of service credit. As such, the correct
standard of review in reviewing the statutory language of U.C. A. §49-11-401 is
clear error and deference to the agency's interpretation and application of the law.
Petitioner incorrectly argues that Sindt v. Utah State Ret Bd.„ 2007 UT 16
supports his proposed standard of review. Although the Court in Sindt clearly
understood the issues surrounding the correct standard of review as it applies to
the Board in stating, "Absent a grant of discretion, we review the Board's
application or interpretation of a statute as a question of law under the correctionof-error standard." Sindt v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 2007 UT 16 f 5; citing Morton
Int'l, Inc. v. State Tax Comm % 814 P.2d 581, 589 (Utah 1991); the Court only
looked to the Board's general power to interpret Title 49, not to the Legislature's
express grant of authority to determine service credit in U.C.A. §49-11-401. The
Legislature limited the Board's discretion to define terms in Title 49 to cases when
the Board "provides written documentation which demonstrates that the
interpretation or definition promotes uniformity in the administration of the
systems or maintains the actuarial soundness . . . " U.C.A. §49-ll-203(l)(k).
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However, as stated supra, the Legislature granted the Board and the Retirement
Office the broad authority to calculate service credit under U.C.A. §49-11-401.
In sum, because the Board and the Retirement Office has been granted with
the express discretion to determine eligibility and computation of service credit
under Utah Code Ann. §49-11-401, the correct standard of review is deference to
the Board's interpretation and application of the law in this case.
The Board agrees with Petitioner that the standard of review on his
equitable estoppel claim is "clear error" on the facts, and correctness on the law.
See, Petitioner's Brief at 3. This Court recently addressed the correct standard of
review for claims of equitable estoppel before the Board in Terry v. Retirement
Board, 2007 UT App 87. This Court found that equitable estoppel claim "presents
a mixed question, which 'involves the application of law to fact.'" Terry v.
Retirement Board, 2007 UT App 87 ^[8; citing State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f33
n. 12, 70 P.3d 111 (quotation and citations omitted.). This Court continued "there
are facts, including policy concerns, an agency's expertise in a specific area of
law, and the complexity of the given legal question, which may alter the amount of
deference an appellate court gives an agency's decision when reviewing mixed
questions of law and fact." Id.; citing Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177,
181 (Utah 1997). "Depending on the circumstances, an appellate court may
review the agency decision with a level of deference 'falling anywhere between a
review for correctness and a broad abuse of discretion standard.'" Id. In
reviewing the underlying facts applied to equitable estoppel this Court applied a
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"deferential clear error standard/' and "no deference need be given [the Board's]
resolution of such questions of law." Id. This same standard should be applied
here to Petitioner's estoppel claim.
This Court in Terry also provided the correct standard of review for issues
involving due process. The Court found, "'questions regarding whether an
administrative agency afforded a petitioner due process in its hearings are
questions of law,' which we review for correctness." Id. at f9; quoting Sierra
Club v. Utah Solid & Hazardous Waste Control Bd., 964 P.2d 335, 347 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Utah Code Ann. §49-11-401. Transfer of service credit — Eligibility for
service credit — Computation of service credit — Retirement from most recent
system.
(1) (a) The office shall make the transfer of service credit, together with related
member and participating employer contributions, from one system to another
upon terms and conditions established by the board.
(b) The terms and conditions may not result in a loss of accrued benefits.
(2) Transfer of employment from a position covered by one system to a
position covered by another system does not cause the employee to lose active
member status.
(3) In the accrual of service credit, the following provisions apply:
(a) A person employed and compensated by a participating employer who
meets the eligibility requirements for membership in a system or the Utah
Governors' and Legislators' Retirement Plan shall receive service credit for the
term of the employment provided that all required contributions are paid to the
office.
(b) An allowance or other benefit may not accrue under this title which is based
upon the same period of employment as has been the basis for any retirement
benefits under some other public retirement system.
(c) The board shall fix the minimum time per day, per month, and per
year upon the basis of which one year of service and proportionate parts of a
year shall be credited toward qualification for retirement. Service may be
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computed on a fiscal or calendar year basis and portions of years served shall be
accumulated and counted as service. In any event, all of the service rendered in
any one fiscal or calendar year may not count for more than one year.
(d) Service credit shall be accrued on a fiscal or calendar year basis as
determined by the participating employer.
(e) A member may not accrue more than one year of service credit per
fiscal or calendar year as determined by the office.
(f) Fractions of years of service credit shall be accumulated and counted in
proportion to the work performed.
(4) The office may estimate the amount of service credit, compensation, or age
of any member, participant, or alternate payee, if information is not contained in
the records.
(5) A member shall retire from the system which most recently covered the
member.
(Emphasis added.)

SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Norman O. Whitaker ("Petitioner") filed a Request for Board Action on
January 18, 2006, requesting the Utah State Retirement Board (hereinafter
"Board") grant his request that he receive more than one year of retirement service
credit for one fiscal or calendar year of work. Hearing Record (hereinafter "HR")
at 4. A hearing was held on June 14, 2006 before Administrative Hearing Officer
(hereinafter "AHO"), Richard C. Howe, on Petitioner's Request for Board Action.
See, HR at 383. Petitioner was represented by Phillip W. Dyer of the Law Offices
of Phillip W. Dyer. The Board was represented by David B. Hansen. After
reviewing the post hearing papers, the AHO ruled in favor of the Board and
directed Mr. Hansen, counsel for the Board, to draft a proposed Order. See, HR at
239-240.

Petitioner filed written objections to the proposed Order on September

12, 2006. See, HR at 275. The Board responded to Petitioner's written objections
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to the proposed Order on September 19, 2006. See, HR at 339. An amended
Order was signed by the AHO on October 26, 2006. See, HR at 376; See also
attached Addendum A. The Board adopted the amended Order on November 9,
2006. See, HRat377. Petitioner filed his Petition for Review in this matter on
December 7, 2006.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/ FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1.

Petitioner is a member of the Public Employees Non-Contributory
Retirement System ("PERS") due to his employment with the State of Utah
("State") and West Point City ("City"). Petitioner is also a member of the
Public Employees Contributory Retirement System due to his previous
employment with Davis and Weber County Canal Agency ("County"). HR
at 370.

2.

PERS and PECRS are administered by the Utah State Retirement Office
("the Retirement Office"). Id. at 371.

3.

Petitioner began working for the State on April 15, 1989, and is currently
an active employee. Id.

4.

Petitioner began working for the City on January 1, 1994, and is currently
an active employee. Id.

5.

Petitioner was employed with the County from November 1, 1989, through
April 30, 1993. Petitioner worked for a total of 3.5 years for the County.
Id.

9

The Retirement Office sends out annual statements to all members who
have contributions on record. The annual statements include total years
worked for all participating employers. For example, the statement sent out
after the end of 2004 read in part as follows:
"SERVICE CREDIT PER SYSTEM AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2004
CONTRIBUTORY LOCAL GOVERNMENT [1]
3.500 YEARS
NONCONTRIBUTORY LOCAL GOVERNMENT [2] 10.834 YEARS
NONCONTRIBUTORY STATE AND SCHOOL [2] 15.654 YEARS"
"PLEASE EXAMINE THIS STATEMENT - If the balances shown on
the accompanying statement are not correct, please write promptly giving
details of any differences to our auditors, Deloitte & Touche, Attention:
URS, 50 South Main Street, Suite 1800, Salt Lake City, UT 84144-0458,
who are presently engaged in the regular examination of our financial
statements. Correspondence should include your name, Social Security
number, and a copy of this statement. If this statement is correct, no
reply is necessary." (Emphasis in original).
Id.
The following or a similar notification was contained on every annual
statement sent out by the Retirement Office, "If you are a member in more
than one Retirement System, if you are a part-time elected or appointed
official, or if you are employed with two or more employers at the same
time, you will need to contact the Retirement Office." Id.
Petitioner testified that in or about October 2003, he contacted the
Retirement Office to request a retirement estimate. In November 2003, he
received the retirement estimate notifying him that as of May 16, 2006,
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assuming continued full-time employment, he would have a total of 17.087
years of service credit. Id. at 372.
9.

Marcia Stroud, Retirement Advisor for the Retirement Office, testified that
on August 29, 2005, at Petitioner's request, she sent Petitioner a new
retirement benefit estimate showing the calculation of Petitioner's
retirement service credit. Different from the 2003 estimate, this estimate
included a three-year service credit purchase for military service. The
estimate showed that on May 16, 2006, assuming continued full-time
employment, Petitioner would have 20.087 years of service credit. Id.

10.

Petitioner testified that on November 2, 2005, in a meeting with himself,
Mr. Felshaw King, and Retirement Office employees Marcia Stroud and
Chris Blevins, the Retirement Office clearly explained to Petitioner that he
was not eligible for more than one year of service credit for one fiscal or
calendar year of work. Id.

11.

Petitioner testified that he has not retired or terminated his employment
with either the State or the City. Id.

12.

Petitioner testified that had he known in 1994 that he could not count
toward his retirement two years of service credit for each year that he
worked for two employers, he would have accepted another position with
West Point City, would have resigned has job with the State, and would
have gone back to work in the construction industry with his brother as an
appraiser and would have earned about $3,000 more per year. Petitioner
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provided no other evidence that he sustained injury or harm due to his
reliance on the Retirement Office's annual statements. Id.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The language in U.C.A. §49-1 l-401(3)(c) and (e) is plain that a member of
the retirement systems cannot receive more than one year of retirement service
credit per fiscal or calendar year. This section states:
(3) In the accrual of service credit, the following provisions apply: .. .
(c) The board shall fix the minimum time per day, per month, and per year
upon the basis of which one year of service and proportionate parts of a
year shall be credited toward qualification for retirement. Service may be
computed on a fiscal or calendar year basis and portions of years served
shall be accumulated and counted as service. In any event, all of the
service rendered in any one fiscal or calendar year may not count for more
than one year.
(e) A member may not accrue more than one year of service credit per
fiscal or calendar year as determined by the office.
(emphasis added).
The language in U.C.A. §49-1 l-401(3)(c) is plain and not capable of two or
more plausible meanings. The phrase "all of the service" in subsection 3(c)
contains no qualification or limitation. The word "all" cannot be interpreted to
mean something less than the entire duties and obligations a member has
performed which might be counted for retirement service credit. However,
Petitioner provides no rationale why this particular limitation to the word "all"
should be used, as opposed to any other implausible non-textual phrases. Thus,
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Petitioner's request for a finding of ambiguity in U.C.A. §49-11 -40 l(3)(c) should
be rejected.
However, even if this Court were to find U.C.A. § 49-11-401(3)
ambiguous, this Court should defer to the Board's reasonable and rational
conclusions of law because the Legislature explicitly granted the board and the
office the authority to interpret and apply these subsections. See, U.C.A. § 49-11401(3). The Board's position is and has always been that a person cannot receive
more than one year of service credit in any one year.
Similarly, U.C.A. §401(3)(e) specifically gives the Retirement Office the
discretion to determine and limit service credit to one year for each fiscal or
calendar year. It is undisputed that the Retirement Office's consistent policy was
that Petitioner could only receive one year of service credit for each year he
worked. Hence, even if a portion of the section is found to be ambiguous, the
plain language of U.C.A. §401(3)(c) and (e) give the Board and the Retirement
Office discretion to determine the accrual of service credit during a fiscal or
calendar year. Because the Board and the Retirement Office policy is both
reasonable and rational that any member could receive one year of service credit
per fiscal or calendar year, this Court should defer to the Board's legal conclusions
finding, "Petitioner is precluded by Utah Code Ann. §49-11-401(3 )(c) and (e)
from earning more than one year of service credit in any one calendar or fiscal
year." HRat373.
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In the alternative, even if this Court finds ambiguity and reviews the
Board's Order under a correction of error standard, public policy favors the
Board's application of the statute. Multiple states have similar statutes limiting
service credit to one year for each year worked. Yet, none of these states have
ever interpreted their statutes in the way Petitioner desires.
Further, sound actuarial principles prevent the retirement office from
paying out benefits long before they are intended to become available to
Petitioner. When Petitioner qualifies for retirement, he will receive a benefit
based on all his service with each employer. If Petitioner were to receive his
retirement benefit now, he would receive a much higher benefit for working much
less time than a similarly situated employee working only one job. The board is
not aware of any public policy favoring an employee in two jobs over an employee
in only one position. Thus, public policy and general notions of fairness also favor
to board's conclusion of law.
Petitioner also incorrectly argues that he should be able to purchase service credit
under U.C.A. §49-1 l-403(l)(d) as "forfeited" service credit. Yet, because
Petitioner never forfeited any of his service credit, he is not eligible to purchase
service credit under that section. First, he had no service credit to forfeit. Because
of the limitations in U.C.A. §49-11-401(3) discussed supra, his service credit was
limited to one year for each year worked. Thus, Petitioner had nothing to forfeit.
Second, neither Petitioner nor the Retirement Office did anything to
effectuate a forfeiture of service credit. Although no specific statutory provision

14

governs the forfeiture or relinquishment of service credit prior to retirement,
U.C.A. §49-11-619 allows a retiree or beneficiary of a retirement benefit to
"relinquish" or forfeit "a benefit under this title by signing an irrevocable written
relinquishment." Without such a signed statement, no relinquishment or forfeiture
is accepted by the Retirement Office. As such, Petitioner does not qualify to
purchase service credit under U.C.A. §49-11-403.
In addition, Petitioner's claim for equitable esoppel also should be denied.
The Board correctly found that Petitioner failed to prove an unusual circumstance
to obtain estoppel against the Board as a governmental entity. Yet, even if the
court applies the common law estoppel rules, Petitioner failed to prove reasonable
reliance and harm due to the Board's statements to Petitioner.
"As a general rule, estoppel may not be invoked against a governmental
entity. In Utah, there is a limited exception to this general principle for 'unusual
circumstances' 'where it is plain that the interests of justice so require.' This
exception applies, however, only if 'the facts may be found with such certainty,
and the injustice suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception.'"
Anderson v. Public Service Comm % 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992)(finding that
Commission was not estopped from revoking limousine company's certificate of
convenience and necessity after allegedly orally settling all claims against
company)(citations omitted). Petitioner's misunderstanding that he could retire
with over 30 years of service credit which was corrected by the Retirement Office
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prior to his retirement does not arise to the level of an unusual circumstance
causing grave injustice.
Even if Petitioner could sustain an estoppel claim against the Board
as a governmental entity, Petitioner cannot prove the elements of estoppel.
Specifically, Petitioner did not prove any statement on which he reasonably relied
to his detriment. Although Petitioner testified that he would have taken another
position had he known he could not receive two years of service credit for one
year of actual work, he provided no written documentation of other jobs available,
the salary or benefits of those jobs, or any evidence that he was qualified to obtain
such positions. Petitioner provided no other evidence that he sustained injury or
harm due to reliance on the Retirement Office's Annual Statements. Because
Petitioner cannot prove reasonable reliance, or injury based on Retirement Office
statements, he cannot make a successful estoppel claim against the Board.
Finally, Petitioner's claim of due process violations regarding the
accidental loss of part of the original recording is now moot. The record has been
supplemented with the testimony of Judy Lund from an additional hearing held
last month for that purpose. In addition, Petitioner provided no explanation why
any other due process violations existed at the hearing.
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's appeal should be dismissed in its
entirety. Under Title 49, Petitioner simply cannot receive more than one year of
service credit for one year of actual work.
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ARGUMENT

I.

THE BOARD CORRECTLY APPLIED THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF U.C. A. §4911-401(3)(C) AND (E) WHICH MANDATED THAT A RETIREMENT SYSTEM
MEMBER CANNOT RECEIVE MORE THAN ONE YEAR OF SERVICE CREDIT
FOR ONE YEAR OF ACTUAL WORK.

U.C.A. §49-1 l-401(3)(c) and (e) is plain that a member of the retirement
systems cannot be credited with more than one year of retirement service credit
per fiscal or calendar year. This section states:
(3) In the accrual of service credit, the following provisions apply:.. .
(c) The board shall fix the minimum time per day, per month, and per year
upon the basis of which one year of service and proportionate parts of a
year shall be credited toward qualification for retirement. Service may be
computed on a fiscal or calendar year basis and portions of years served
shall be accumulated and counted as service. In any event, all of the
service rendered in any one fiscal or calendar year may not count for more
than one year.
(e) A member may not accrue more than one year of service credit per
fiscal or calendar year as determined by the office.
The plain language of this subsection mandates: 1) "all of the service"
performed in one year cannot count for more than one year of service credit; and
2) it explicitly grants the board (in subsection 3(c)) and the office (in subsection
3(e)) the discretion to determine when a member is eligible and qualifies for
service credit.
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A.

T H E PLAIN LANGUAGE OF U.C.A. § 4 9 - 1 1 - 4 0 1 ( 3 ) ( C ) AND (E)
SUPPORTS THE BOARD'S CONCLUSION OF LAW THAT PETITIONER
IS PRECLUDED "FROM EARNING MORE THAN ONE YEAR OF
SERVICE CREDIT IN ANY ONE FISCAL OR CALENDAR YEAR."

The Board correctly held that the plain language of U.C.A. §49-11401(3)(c) and (e) mandates that".. . all of the service rendered in any one fiscal or
calendar year may not count for more than one year." HRat373. "The court's
principal duty in interpreting statutes is to determine legislative intent, and the best
evidence of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute." Jensen v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984). Petitioner's
attempt to manufacture ambiguity in this statute where none exists should be
rejected.
The Utah Supreme Court set forth that, "c[u]nder our rules of statutory
construction, we look first to the statute's plain language to determine its
meaning.'" Sindt v. Utah State Ret. Bd, 2007 UT 16, Tf8, 157 P.3d 797, 799
(quoting, Mountain Estates v. State Tax Comm % 2004 UT 86, ^[9, 100 P.3d 1206).
"Only if we find some ambiguity need we look further." CIG Exploration, Inc. v.
Tax Comm'n, 897 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 1995)(findingphrase "erroneously or
illegally collected" in refund statute was not ambiguous and the State Tax
Commission correctly assessed taxes based on property valuation as of statutory
valuation date). However, "[t]he fact that the parties offer differing constructions
of the statute, in and of itself, does not mean that the statute is 'ambiguous.' See,
Eppersen v. Utah State Retirement Bd, 949 P.2d 779, 783 n.6 (Utah Ct. App.
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1997). 'Ambiguous' means capable of 'two or more plausible meanings.9"
Derbidge v. Mutual Protective Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah Ct. App.
1998)(quoting, Alfv. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah
1993); Village Inn Apts. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 790 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990)).
The language in U.C.A. §49-11 -401 (3)(c) is plain and not capable of two or
more plausible meanings. U.C.A. §49-1 l-401(3)(c) states:
The board shall fix the minimum time per day, per month, and per
year upon the basis of which one year of service and proportionate
parts of a year shall be credited toward qualification for retirement.
Service may be computed on a fiscal or calendar year basis and
portions of years served shall be accumulated and counted as
service. In any event, all of the service rendered in any one fiscal or
calendar year may not count for more than one year.
(emphasis added).
The phrase "all of the service" in subsection 3(c) contains no qualification
or limitation. The word "all" cannot be interpreted, as Petitioner suggests, to mean
something less than the entire duties and obligations a member has performed
which might be counted for retirement service credit. Only by rewriting the
statute by adding terms which the legislature never intended can the phrase "all of
the service" be interpreted to mean something less than "all." Nevertheless,
Petitioner suggests the Court insert the phrase "for each employer" in the statute
after the word "rendered." Petitioner's Brief at 27. However, Petitioner provides
no rationale why this particular limitation to the word "all" should be used and the
Board refuses to speculate on any other potential non-textual limitations to the
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word "all." Nevertheless, Petitioner's request for a finding of ambiguity in U.C.A.
§49-11-401(3)(c) should be rejected.
Additionally, in reviewing subsection (3)(c) with subsection (3)(e), no
question exists that the legislature intended to allow a maximum of one year of
service credit for one year of service or work. Subsection (3)(e) states, "A
member may not accrue more than one year of service credit per fiscal or calendar
year as determined by the office." This language is plain and not subject to any
other interpretation. The language clearly provides that no member can receive
more than one year of service credit in any one year period. Thus, the plain
language of the statute clearly supports the Board's Conclusion of Law #2 which
states:
2.
Petitioner is precluded by Utah Code Ann. §49-11-401 (3) (c)
and (e) from earning more than one year of service credit in any one
calendar or fiscal year. These statutory sections are not ambiguous.
Utah Code Ann. §49-11-401(3)(c) states,
The board shall fix the minimum time per day, per
month, and per year upon the basis of which one year
of service and proportionate parts of a year shall be
credited toward qualification for retirement. Service
may be computed on a fiscal or calendar year basis and
portions of years served shall be accumulated and
counted as service. In any event, all of the service
rendered in any one fiscal or calendar year may not
count for more than one year.
Section (c) does not contain any qualification or limitation. It
provides that".. .All of the service rendered in any one fiscal or
calendar year may not count for more than one year." This language
must be interpreted to mean "all service" rendered by a public
employee in one year whether to one or multiple employers.
In addition, Utah Code Ann. §49-11-401(3 )(e) also supports
this interpretation stating, "A member may not accrue more than one
year of service credit per fiscal or calendar year as determined by the
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office." This subsection contains no qualification or limitation that
would limit its application to one employer. It is immaterial whether
the service is rendered to one employer or multiple employers.
HRat373.
The Board correctly determined that U.C.A. §49-11-401(3)(c) and (e) plainly and
unambiguously explained that the unqualified phrase "all of the service" meant
'all service' rendered by a public employee in one year whether to one or multiple
employers. Id. Thus, Petitioner's request to expand the clear meaning of the statute
should be rejected.

B.

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, EVEN IF THE COURT FINDS AMBIGUITY IN
U . C A. § 49-ll-401(3)(C) AND (E), THE COURT SHOULD DEFER TO
THE BOARD'S REASONABLE AND RATIONAL CONCLUSION OF LAW
THAT A MEMBER CAN RECEIVE A MAXIMUM OF ONE YEAR OF
SERVICE CREDIT FOR ONE YEAR OF WORK.

U.C.A. §49-11-401(3)(c) and (e) contain no ambiguity and the plain
language of these subsections limits a member to earning one year of service
credit during any one fiscal or calendar year. However, even if this Court were to
find these subsections ambiguous, this Court should defer to the Board's
reasonable and rational conclusions of law because the legislature explicitly
granted the board and the office the authority to interpret and apply these
subsections.
The Utah Supreme Court held in Morton InVl, Inc. v. State Tax Comm 'n,
814 P.2d 581, 589 (Utah 1991),
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In Salt Lake City Corp. v. Confer, we held that an agency's interpretation of
statutory provisions is entitled to deference when there is more than one
permissible reading of the statute and no basis in the statutory language or
the legislative history to prefer one interpretation over another... .[I]n the
absence of a discernible legislative intent concerning the specific question
in issue, a choice among permissible interpretations of a statute is largely a
policy determination. The agency that has been granted authority to
administer the statute is the appropriate body to make such a determination.
Indeed, both the legislative history to section 63-46b-16 and our prior cases
suggest that an appellate court should not substitute its judgment for the
agency's judgment concerning the wisdom of the agency's policy. When
there is no discernible legislative intent concerning a specific issue the
legislature has, in effect, left the issue unresolved. In such a case, it is
appropriate to conclude that the legislature has delegated authority to the
agency to decide the issue. Such an approach is particularly appropriate
when it is reasonable to assume that the legislature intended the agency to
have some discretion in dealing with the statutory provision at issue,
(footnotes omitted).
The Morton Court found that grants of authority may either be explicit or
implicit. See, Morton, 814 P.2d at 589. In Morton, the court used an example of
an explicit statutory grant of discretion to the State Tax Commission when the
statute stated that certain taxes would be levied "as determined by the
commission". See, Id. at 588 n.40. On the other hand, an implicit grant of
discretion is found when "there is no discernible legislative intent concerning a
specific issue the legislature has, in effect, left the issue unresolved. In such a
case, it is appropriate to conclude that the legislature has delegated authority to the
agency to decide the issue." Id.
In more recent cases, the court reiterated its holding in Morton that the
court should defer to the agency if authority to interpret and apply the law has
been granted by the legislature. See e.g., Sindt v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 2007 UT 16.
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The Court of Appeals interpreted the Morton decision in allowing agency's
discretion to interpret and apply the law under a "reasonable and rational"
standard. See, King v. Industrial Comm 'n. of Utah, 850 P.2d 1281 (Utah Ct. App.
1993).
In this case, Section 401(3)(c) plainly gives "the board" discretion in
determining how to credit "service" toward eligibility of the statutory defined
retirement benefit. It states, "the board shall fix the minimum time . . . upon
which one year of service . . . shall be credited toward qualification for retirement.
. . . In any event, all of the service rendered in any one fiscal or calendar year may
not count for more than one year." (emphasis added). The legislature recognized
the board's role in calculating service credit in qualifying for retirement, and
granted it discretion to fulfill that role. Because the Board maintains the discretion
to determine service credit under this statute, if this Court finds ambiguity in the
statutes, this Court should defer to the board's legal conclusions and
interpretations because they are reasonable and rational.
The Board specifically stated in its order on this case, "Petitioner is
precluded by Utah Code Ann. §49-11-401 (3) (c) and (e) from earning more than
one year of service credit in any one calendar or fiscal year.... This language
must be interpreted to mean "all service" rendered by a public employee in one
year whether to one or multiple employers." HRat373. The Board's position is
and has always been that a person cannot receive more than one year of service
credit in any one year. Certainly no contrary evidence was received at the hearing
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to show that any individual had ever received more than one year of service credit
for one year of actual work. Supplemental HT: 13. Thus, because the Legislature
clearly gave the Board discretion and because the Board clearly determined to
only allow one year of service credit, no matter the number of jobs, for one year of
actual work, the court should defer to the Board's legal conclusion if ambiguity is
found in the statute.
Similarly, U.C.A. §401(3)(e) specifically gives the Retirement Office the
discretion to determine and limit service credit to one year for each fiscal or
calendar year. It unambiguously states, "A member may not accrue more than one
year of service credit per fiscal or calendar year as determined by the office"
(emphasis added).1 It is undisputed that the Retirement Office's consistent policy
was that Petitioner could only receive one year of service credit for each year he
worked. Again, no evidence was presented to the contrary. In fact, Petitioner
admits that in November 2003 the Retirement Office specifically told him he
would have 17.087 years of service credit by May 16, 2006 (one year of service
credit for each year worked). HT at 145-146. Furthermore, at the hearing,
Retirement Office employees specifically and consistently testified that the

1

This grant of discretion is almost identical to the example the Morton court used
of a grant of explicit discretion in U.C.A. §59-12-104(16)(1991). See, Morton 814
P.2d at 588, n.40. That statute stated "sales or leases of machinery and equipment
purchased or leased by a manufacturer for use in new or expanding operations
(excluding normal operating replacements . . . as determined by the commission)"
(emphasis added by the court in Morton.) Thus, because the Utah Supreme Court
used this language as an example of an explicit grant of discretion in Morton, this
Court should also find an explicit grant of discretion here.
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Retirement Office would not allow a member to receive more than one year of
service credit for one year of actual work. HT at 43-44; 60; Supplemental HT 13;
29; 45.
Hence, even if a portion of the section is found to be ambiguous, the plain
language of U.C.A. §401(3)(c) and (e) gives the Board and the Retirement Office
discretion to determine the accrual of service credit during a fiscal or calendar
year. Since the Board and the Retirement Office policy is both reasonable and
rational in its determination that any member could receive one year of service
credit per fiscal or calendar year, this Court should defer to the Board's legal
conclusions finding that: "Petitioner is precluded by Utah Code Ann. §49-11401(3)(c) and (e) from earning more than one year of service credit in any one
calendar or fiscal year." HR at 373.

C.

EVEN IF AMBIGUOUS AND REVIEWED UNDER A CORRECTION OF

ERROR STANDARD, PUBLIC POLICY FAVORS THE BOARD'S
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING U.C.A. § 49-ll-401(C) AND (E)
THAT A MEMBER CAN RECEIVE ONLY ONE YEAR OF SERVICE
CREDIT FOR ONE YEAR OF ACTUAL WORK.
As stated supra, U.C.A. §49-11-401(3)(c) and (e) contain no ambiguity.
However, in the alternative, if ambiguity is found, and if this Court determines it
need not defer to the Board's Conclusions of Law, public policy considerations
demonstrate that the Board correctly applied the law in accordance with the
Legislature's intent. When an agency has not been granted discretion, Courts look
to the legislative history and policy considerations when interpreting ambiguous
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statutes. "Only when [the Court] find[s] ambiguity in the statute's plain language
need [the Court] seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy
considerations." World Peace Movement of Am. v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879
P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994). "When interpreting an ambiguous statute, [the Court]
first tr[ies] to discover the underlying intent of the legislature, guided by the
purpose of the statute as a whole and the legislative history." Hansen v. Salt Lake
Co., 19 A P.2d 838, 841 (Utah 1990)(citations omitted). Here, the legislative intent
can be shown by both reviewing the purpose section of Title 49 and looking to
other state's statutes.
A multitude of other public retirement systems have similar statutory
provisions to U.C.A.§49-11-401(3)(c) and (e) requiring one year of service credit
for one year of service, and no state allows an employee to earn more than one
years of service credit for one year worked. A cursory search found that Alaska2,
Hawaii3, Illinois4, Indiana5, Louisiana6, Maine7, Maryland8, Michigan9,

2

The Alaska Teacher's Retirement System prohibits more than one year of service
credit per one calendar year in AK ST § 14.25.169, which states: " . . . A teacher
may not receive (1) duplicate credit under this plan for the same period of service,
(2) more than one year of service credit in the course of a school year . . ."; AS
39.35.530 provides the same language for the Alaska Public Employees'
Retirement System
3
The Hawaii Public Retirement System statutes provide in HI ST § 88-50: "The
board of trustees may fix and determine by appropriate rules and regulations how
much service in any year is equivalent to a year of service but in no case shall
more than one year of service be credited in twelve calendar months,. .."
4
Illinois Pension Code provides in 40 ILCS 5/13-401(e): "Overtime or extra
service shall not be included in computing any service. Not more than one year of
service credit shall be allowed for service rendered during any calendar year".
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Minnesota10, Nebraska11, Pennsylvania12, Texas13 and Virginia14 all statutorily
prohibit employees from receiving more than one year of service credit per year.

5

Indiana Teachers' Retirement System statutes provide in IC 5-10.4-4-2(c):
"Except as otherwise specified, a member may not be granted more than one (1)
year of credit for service in a calendar year or fiscal year".
6
Louisiana Public Retirement System statutes provide in LSA-R.S. 11:191: " . . .
In no event shall such person be allowed to earn more than one year of service
credit in any one year. Service credit earned in more than one retirement system
or fund in any one year shall not be transferred or recognized reciprocally to attain
more than one year of service credit in any one system in any one year";
Louisiana Public Retirement System statutes for city employees provides in LSAR.S. 11:3036(B) " . . . Not more than one year of service credit shall be allowed
for all service rendered during any one calendar year"; and, Louisiana Teacher's
Retirement System statutes provide in LSA-R.S. 11:701(9): " . . . A person may
not obtain more than one year of service credit during any fiscal year".
7
Maine State Retirement System statutes provide in 5 M.R.S.A. § 17758(2):
"Limitation: The member may not receive more than one year of service credit in
any one-year period".
8
Maryland Employees' and Teachers' Retirement System statutes provide in MD
Code, State Personnel and Pensions, § 22-302(b): "The Board of Trustees may
not allow more than 1 year of service credit for a calendar year"; the same
language in also in MD § 23-302(b), § 24-302(b), § 25-302(b), and § 26-302.
9
Michigan Public School Employees Retirement System statutes provide in
M.C.L.A. 38.1368(3): "In computing terms of service, a year shall be a legal
fiscal year at the time and place where the service was performed. Not more than
1 year's service shall be counted for retirement purposes in any school fiscal
year".
10
Minnesota Teacher's Retirement System statutes provide in M.S.A. §
354.091(3): "in no case may a member receive more than one year of service
credit for any fiscal year".
11
Nebraska School Employees' Retirement System statutes provide in Neb.Rev.St.
§ 79-927(4): "The board may adopt and promulgate rules and regulations for the
granting of service credit in accordance with this section, but in not case shall
more than one year of service be granted for all service in one plan year".
12
Pennsylvania School Employees Retirement System statutes provide in 24
Pa.C.S.A. § 8302(a): " . . . In no case shall a member receive more than one year
of credited service for any 12 consecutive months or a member who has elected
multiple service receive an aggregate in the two systems of more than one year of
credited service for any 12 consecutive months".
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Additionally, no case law exists allowing an employee to receive more than one
year of service credit per year. Thus, while multiple states have similar statutes to
Utah, no state has adopted Petitioner's proposed interpretation of the law.
In addition to other states, the purpose section of Title 49 contains relevant
provisions showing the intent of the Legislature to limit service credit to one year
for each year worked. All these provisions relate to the potential actuarial impact
of Petitioner's argument. U.C.A. § 49-11-103 states,
(1) The purpose of this title is to establish:
(a) retirement systems and the Utah Governors1 and Legislators* Retirement
Plan for members which provide:
(i) a uniform system of membership;
(ii) retirement requirements;
(iii) benefits for members;
(iv) funding on an actuarially sound basis;
(v) contributions; and
(vi) economy and efficiency in public service; and
(b) a central administrative office and a board to administer the various
systems, plans, and programs established by the Legislature or the board.
(2) This title shall be liberally construed to provide maximum benefits and
protections consistent with soundfiduciary and actuarial principals.
(emphasis added).

13

Teacher Retirement System of Texas statutes provide in V.T.C.A., Government
Code § 823.002(a): "The board of trustees by rule shall determine how much
service in any year is equivalent to one year of service credit, but in no case may
all of a person's service in one school year be creditable as more than one year of
service".
14
Virginia Retirement System statutes provide in Va. Cod Ann. § 51.1-141: " . . .
The Board shall not allow more than one year of service credit for all service
rendered in any period of twelve consecutive months".
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Thus, the purpose of this title contains several relevant provisions showing the
policy of the legislature. All relate to the potential actuarial impact of Petitioner's
argument.
First, Title 49 creates retirement systems with a "uniform system of
membership" and specific "retirement requirements". In other words, all
employees in the same retirement system should abide by the same rules to qualify
for a retirement benefit. However, Petitioner is attempting to bend the retirement
rules in his favor by only working 17 years until being eligible to receive a
retirement benefit, while other employees who work for one employer have to
work 30 years before drawing a benefit. Nothing in law favors an employee who
works for two public employers at the same time over one who works full time for
one public employer. Yet, Petitioner attempts to artificially increase the
retirement benefits of the individual who works two 20 hour per week jobs over an
employee who works one 40 hour per week job. His argument that he should
receive a benefit now clearly violates the policy of the legislature in Title 49 and
would give him a windfall.
Second, subsection 2 of U.C.A. §49-11-103 allows that "This title shall by
liberally construed to provide maximum benefits and protections consistent with
sound fiduciary and actuarial principles." Contrary to Petitioner's implication that
"maximizing benefits" means accepting any argument made by a Petitioner to the
Board, the Retirement Office has a specific duty to provide the statutory benefits
in accordance with plain language of the statute and the Board's actuary's
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assumptions. As discussed supra, the plain language of the statute supports the
Board's position that Petitioner can only receive one year of service credit for one
year of work. Yet, even if the statute is found ambiguous, Petitioner's arguments
would conflict with sound actuarial principles, and thus violate the purpose of the
Title 49. Ms. Lund from the retirement office, with 25 years of experience,
testified that it was her understanding that granting more than one year of service
credit for one year of actual work would have an adverse actuarial impact on the
retirement system.15 Even without an actuary's testimony, common sense dictates
that allowing more than one year of service credit for one year of actual work
would have an actuarial impact on the retirement system. Because retirement
benefits through URS are lifetime benefits, if an individual is able to draw on
those benefits earlier in his lifetime, it will cost the retirement system more money
because they will be paying out benefits for a longer period of time and will not
get the benefit of investment returns over that extra time.16 In such a scenario, as
Petitioner notes, contribution rates may need to be raised on ALL of the employers
in the retirement system. Thus, Petitioner wants his double benefit at the expense
of all the other public employers in the retirement system. This he cannot do.
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If Mr. Whitaker believed that his argument was actuarially sound, he needed to
provide an actuary to confirm his findings. However, no actuarial testimony was
heard at the hearing to support Mr. Whitaker's position that he could receive more
than one year of service credit for one year of actual work.
16
For example, if an employee is able to draw a $50,000 benefit at age 60, instead
of 65, that employee would receive an extra $250,000 in benefits, and URS would
not be able to receive any additional investment income over that time.
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Third, contrary to Petitioner's statements in his Brief, when Petitioner
becomes eligible to retire, he will receive a benefit based on all of his eligible
service from each of his employers. Petitioner misconstrues the way his
retirement benefit will be calculated in claiming that his employers have paid
retirement contributions on his behalf, but he will receive no benefit for those
contributions. Petitioner also misconstrues that his employers "purchased" service
credit by paying retirement contributions.
Under Title 49, service credit is used for both qualifying for a retirement
benefit and in calculating a retirement benefit once an individual retires. See,
U.C.A. §§ 49-13-401 and 402. U.C.A. § 49-13-401 sets forth the combination of
age and years of service credit to qualify for a benefit. However, an employee
may retire at any time with more than 30 years of service credit.
Although Petitioner is not eligible to retire now given his age and years of
service credit, Petitioner's retirement benefit, when he's eligible and chooses to
retire, will be calculated by combining the retirement benefit he would receive
from each of his positions with his different employers. See, Supplemental HT
25:18-32:3. In other words, all the salary Petitioner earned from both his
positions will be used in the calculation of his future retirement benefit.
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Petitioner's final average salary is a component of the defined benefit formula
under the Public Employees' Noncontributory Retirement System. The formula is
final average salary times years of service credit x 2%. U.C.A. § 49-11-402.
Thus, because URS will use the salary from each of Petitioner's positions to
calculate his benefit, they should not also increase his service credit in calculating
the benefit.
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Further, employers do not "purchase" service credit for employees in
paying retirement contributions. Retirement contributions, like term life insurance
premiums, are used to spread the risk of retirement liability over a large number of
individuals. These contributions do not correspond to an individual employee's
benefits. All of the retirement contributions paid by his employers will be used to
keep the system actuarially sound in calculating his benefits. Thus, by combining
the retirement benefits from each of his employers, URS maximizes Petitioner's
benefits in accordance with the statutes and sound actuarial principles and
Petitioner does not receive the windfall he so desperately desires. Because of
these reasons public policy favors the Board application of the statute.

II.

PETITIONER CANNOT PURCHASE SERVICE CREDIT UNDER

U.C.A. § 49-11-

403(1)(D) BECAUSE HE HAS NO FORFEITED SERVICE CREDIT.

Because Petitioner never forfeited any of his service credit, he is not
eligible to purchase service credit under U.C.A. §49-1 l-403(l)(d). U.C.A. §4911-403 allows an individual to purchase service credit in limited circumstances.
U.C.A. §49-1 l-403(l)(d) states in part, "A member . . . may purchase service
credit equal to the period of the member's employment in the following:... (d)
forfeited service credit in this state if the member does not qualify for an
allowance based on the service credit.". Thus, a person is eligible to purchase
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service credit under this subsection when a person: 1) previously received service
credit, and 2) forfeited that service credit.

i£

It is undisputed that Petitioner qualified for service credit of 17.087 years of
service credit as of May 16, 2006. However, Petitioner's allegation that he
qualified for 32+ years of service credit is incorrect. As stated supra, pursuant to
U.C.A. §49-11-401(3)(c) and (e), Petitioner can only earn one year of service
credit for each year of actual work. Petitioner's request to have "forfeited" service
credit is entirely dependent on having service credit to forfeit. Of course, if
Petitioner had service credit, he has no need to forfeit that service credit. Thus,
although Petitioner is eligible to forfeit any of his 17.087 years of service credit,
he cannot forfeit something he merely desires.
Additionally, Petitioner has done nothing to forfeit any service credit.
Petitioner wants this Court to claim he has "effectively" forfeited service credit.
Petitioner's Brief at 33-34. However, as Petitioner admitted, "forfeitures are not
favored in the law." See, Id. at n.19 {quoting Commercial Investment Corp. v.
Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105, 1109 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), quoting, Russell v. Park City
Utah Corp. 506 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1973). Even in a contract where the
18

Judy Lund testified that a forfeiture of service credit typically happens

when a person is in the Contributory Retirement System and takes a refund of
his/her retirement benefit contributions and forfeits their previous service credit in
that system. See, Supplemental HT at 15.
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language is plain, a forfeiture enforcer must "comply strictly with the provisions
of the contract", and "to enforce [the contract terms] it requires some affirmative
act on the part of the [enforcer] to notify the [other party] of what specific
provision of the contract the [enforcer] is proceeding under . . . " Commercial
Investment Corp. 936 P.2d at 1109.
In the retirement context, the notice requirement is similar. Although no
specific statutory provision governs the forfeiture or relinquishment of service
credit prior to retirement, U.C.A. §49-11-619 allows a retiree or beneficiary of a
retirement benefit to "relinquish" or forfeit "a benefit under this title by signing an
irrevocable written relinquishment." Without such a signed statement, no
relinquishment or forfeiture is accepted by the Retirement Office.
In this case, neither the retirement office nor Petitioner did anything either
affirmatively or impliedly which would "effect" a forfeiture of any of Petitioner's
17.087 years of service credit.19 Certainly, Petitioner failed to point to any

19

In the alternative, even if Petitioner establishes he had years of service credit
which were effectively forfeited by the Retirement Office without a specific
forfeiture, Petitioner's requested remedy that "the court determine that
[Petitioner's retirement contributions paid by his employers] constitutes a
purchase of service credits under section 49-11-403(3)" is an unavailable remedy
for Petitioner under U.C.A. §49-11-607. U.C.A.§49-11-607 requires, "if excess
contributions have been received by the office, the contributions shall be refunded
to the participating employer or member who paid the contributions." In
Petitioner's case, his employers paid all of his retirement contributions in the
Noncontributory Retirement System. Thus, if excess contributions were paid on
behalf of Petitioner, all the contributions must be returned to his employer, not to
Petitioner. The employer could then decide whether to contribute those
contributions toward a purchase of service credit for Petitioner under U.C.A. §4911-403, but would have no legal obligation to do so.
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specific forfeiture. As such, Petitioner has nothing to forfeit, forfeited nothing,
and does not qualify to purchase service credit under U.C.A. §49-11-403.

IIL

PETITIONER CANNOT PREVAIL ON A CLAIM FOR ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE
BOARD AS A GOVERNMENT AGENCY BECAUSE HE FAILED TO SHOW
EITHER AN UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCE OR THAT HE REASONABLY RELIED
ON THE BOARD'S STATEMENTS TO HIS DETRIMENT.

Petitioner cannot prevail against the Board under equitable estoppel for two
reasons. First, Petitioner failed to prove an unusual circumstance or grave
injustice to obtain estoppel against the Board as a governmental entity. Second,
even if the court applies the common law estoppel rules, Petitioner failed to show
a Board statement inconsistent with later statements.
A.

ESTOPPEL CANNOT BE INVOKED AGAINST A GOVERNMENT ENTITY
ABSENT UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND GRAVE INJUSTICE.

"As a general rule, estoppel may not be invoked against a governmental
entity. In Utah, there is a limited exception to this general principle for 'unusual
circumstances' 'where it is plain that the interests of justice so require.' This
exception applies, however, only if 'the facts may be found with such certainty,
and the injustice suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception.'"

In such an unlikely scenario, the potential amount of a service credit
purchase would then be determined in accordance with U.C.A. §49-11-403(3)(b)
which requires that, "(b) the amount of payment [for a service credit purchase]
shall be determined by the office based on a formula that is: (i) recommended by
the actuary; and (ii) adopted by the board...." Nothing in this section allows
Petitioner to fashion his own remedy or some other remedy opposite the plain
language of U.C.A. §49-11-607 requiring the retirement office to return excess
contributions to Petitioner's employer.
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Anderson v. Public Service Comm % 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992)(finding that
Commission was not estopped from revoking limousine company's certificate of
convenience and necessity after allegedly orally settling all claims against
company)(citations omitted).
In Anderson v. Public Service Comm 'n, the court established the standard
for a finding of the exception to an "unusual circumstance". The Court in
Andersen held, "the few cases in which Utah Courts have permitted estoppel
against the government have involved very specific written representations by
authorized govt, entities." (emphasis added.) After tracing the specific written
representations in previous cases, the Court stated, "these cases involve clear,
well-substantiated representations by government, entities." Id. at 828; See also,
Thimmes v. Utah State Univ., 2001 UT App. 93, |18, 22 P.3d 257, 259 ("The
exception requires a high standard of proof and has only applied in cases
involving "(very specific written representations by authorized government
entities . . .)" quoting Anderson 839 P.2d at 827. Thus, in order to prevail on a
claim for estoppel, Petitioner had to show a very specific written representation to
have an unusual circumstance.
In this case, Petitioner failed to prove an "unusual circumstance" or grave
injustice. Marcia Stroud testified that both in November 2003 and September
2005 when Petitioner contacted the Retirement Office for a retirement estimate, he
was specifically advised that he would have 17.087 years of service credit as of
May 16, 2006. HT 75-76. Thus, even though Petitioner believed he was entitled to
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more service credit, or a different benefit calculation, this is not an unusual
circumstance causing grave injustice.
Similar to the facts here, several years ago Ogden City paid retirement
contributions on behalf of its public safety officers for GAP time (extra time
worked by employees) which was found to be specifically prohibited by the Utah
State Retirement Act. See, O 'Keefe v. Utah State Retirement Board, 929 P.2d
1112 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); affirmed on other grounds, O 'Keefe v. Utah State
Retirement Board, 956 P.2d 279 (Utah 1998)(0'Keefe chose not to raise the
estoppel issue before the Utah Supreme Court). Joseph O'Keefe, a former Ogden
public safety officer, argued unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeals (using
Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd, 795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) as
his authority) that the Board should be estopped from denying GAP contributions
in his final average salary because the board had accepted the contributions before
learning of their ineligible nature, and because like Petitioner, he reasonably
believed that the contributions were eligible to be included in the calculation of his
retirement benefit. The Court of Appeals held that because O'Keefe "knew prior
to his retirement that the Board had decided to reject GAP contributions . . .
petitioner's estoppel claim does not rise to the level necessary to prevail against a
state agency." O Keefe v. Utah State Retirement Board, 929 P.2d 1112, 1117
(Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Similarly, in Eldredge, the Court applied the same rule as that in O 'Keefe
but held the Retirement Office liable. Similar to Petitioner, Mr. Eldredge
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questioned whether his service rendered prior to the current Retirement Office's
creation in 1961 was eligible for service credit. Unlike Petitioner, after direct
consultation with the Retirement Office, Mr. Eldredge received multiple
communications from the Retirement Office that this service credit was granted to
him under law, including a letter stating these 6.123 years of service were eligible
for service credit, and a retirement estimate showing that he had obtained these
disputed years of service credit. Also unlike Petitioner, based upon these specific
written representations by the Retirement Office, Mr. Eldredge terminated his
position and irrevocably retired. Three months following his receipt of retirement
benefits, the Retirement Office informed Mr. Eldredge that he must either
purchase the 6.123 years of service credit or have his benefit recalculated without
those years. The Court found that these representations crossed the line into an
"unusual circumstance" to invoke estoppel against a government entity.
Thus, in harmonizing both O 'Keefe and Eldredge, the clear rule regarding
estoppel before the Board is that a person without a specific verified
representation, who does not quit his position and retire based on that
representation, cannot sustain a claim for estoppel.21 Here, like O 'Keefe,

20

The Board has only found two instances where the Courts have found an
"unusual circumstance" to invoke estoppel against the government. See,
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm 'n, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979);
Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd, 795 P.2d 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In
each case, the harm was severe. In is not here. Petitioner has not retired.
Petitioner only hopes for a better benefit at some future day.
21
Petitioner argues that government estoppel is only applicable when the
government acts in its official capacity and not in a proprietary capacity. See,
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Petitioner has not terminated his positions nor retired. Furthermore, Petitioner's
estimates and specific verified representations from the Board all consistently
correctly stated his years of service credit (17.087 years as of May 16, 2006) after
a review of his records.

Thus, Petitioner has not proved either "facts with

specificity," or "injustice of sufficient gravity" to invoke any exception to the
general rule that estoppel may not be invoked against a governmental entity.
Anderson v. Public Service Comm 'n, 839 P.2d at 827.

B.

PETITIONER'S CLAIM FOR ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE BOARD FAILS
FOR A LACK OF STATEMENT, LACK OF RELIANCE AND NO INJURY,

In the alternative, even if Petitioner could sustain an estoppel claim against
the Board as a governmental entity, Petitioner cannot prove the elements of
estoppel. Specifically, Petitioner did not prove any statement which the Board
later refuted on which he reasonably relied to his detriment. The Utah Courts have
stated that in order to prevail on a claim for equitable estoppel, Petitioner bears the
burden to prove:
Eldredge 795 P.2d 676-77. Yet this limitation to government estoppel has not
been applied by the courts in any case in the past 17 years since Eldredge in 1990,
despite numerous opportunities to do so. In fact, in the Board's most recent two
estoppel cases, since Eldredge the court made no mention of any "proprietary
capacity" limitation to the government estoppel rule. See, O 'Keefe v. Utah State
Retirement Board, 929 P.2d 1112 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); Terry v. Retirement
Board, 2007 UT App 87.

22

Even Petitioner's annual statements all contain Petitioner's correct service credit.
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(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act
by one party inconsistent with a claim later
asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by
the other party taken on the basis of the first
party's statement, admission, act or failure to
act; and (3) injury to the second party that
would result from allowing the first party to
contradict or repudiate such statement,
admission, act, or failure to act.
Holland v. Career Service Review Bd, 856 P.2d 678 (Utah Ct. App.
1993)(rejecting employee's equitable estoppel claim); See also, Eldredge(ho\6mg
that Board was estopped from decreasing member's benefit after he terminated his
employment and retired). Petitioner cannot meet the necessary elements of
estoppel.
First, the only claimed statement made by the Retirement Office
representatives to Petitioner which were inconsistent with claims the Board later
asserted was a one minute telephone call with Dustin Seeley in October 2005.
Petitioner specifically testified he did nothing in detrimental reliance on this
statement. All other statements with the Retirement Office, including the annual
statements, were consistently correct.
Nevertheless, even if the annual statements are found to be inconsistent
with the Board's later asserted claims, Petitioner did not reasonably rely on them
to his detriment.
The next necessary element of estoppel is the reasonable action or inaction
by the other party taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act
or failure to act. For example, in Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control
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Comm % 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979), the Plaintiffs spent over $200,000 in
renovating their club in direct reliance on prior Liquor Commission's statements
that they were in compliance with the law. In the Eldredge case, the Plaintiff quit
his job and irrevocably retired based on prior information the Retirement Office
had sent to him in specific letters and estimates. In the instant case, Petitioner
testified that each year the Retirement Office sent him general annual statements
informing him of his service credit for each employer (but not service credit
totals). Each annual statement contained the following language, "If you are a
member in more than one Retirement System, if you are a part-time elected or
appointed official, or if you are employed with two or more employers at the same
time, you will need to contact the Retirement Office." HR at 132, Thus, Petitioner
could not reasonably rely on those statements without first contacting the
Retirement Office.
Nevertheless, Petitioner testified that in or about October 2003 he first
contacted the Retirement Office to receive a retirement estimate. See, HT 136-137.
In November 2003, he received his retirement estimate notifying him that as of
May 16, 2006, assuming continued full-time employment, he would have a total of
17.087 years of service credit.
Following the receipt of this estimate, Petitioner did not contact the
Retirement Office again until August 2005 to inquire about his retirement, almost
22 months later. See, HT 146. Petitioner provided no explanation as to why he
waited so long to contact the Retirement Office again. Despite Petitioner's claim
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that it was reasonable to do so because he received another annual statement in
2004, Petitioner failed to explain the lack of contact with the Retirement Office
during the five month gap between the 2003 estimate and receipt of the annual
statement in April 2004.
Then on August 29, 2005, at Petitioner's request, Marcia Stroud sent
Petitioner a new estimate of retirement service credit showing the calculation of
his service credit. See, HT 147. Petitioner made no satisfactory explanation as to
why he asked for a new estimate. This 2005 estimate included a three year
military service purchase and showed that on May 16, 2006, assuming continued
full-time employment Petitioner would have 20.087 years of service credit. See,
HT 147-148. This estimate amount of service credit was identical to Petitioner's
previous estimate received in November 2003, but included the three-year military
purchase.
Petitioner testified that in October 2005, after receipt of this second
estimate, he again contacted the Retirement Office and spoke with Dustin Seely
via telephone. Mr. Seely told Petitioner that he had 31+ years of "unverified"
service credit. See, HT 38.
Testimony was provided that on November 2, 2005, in a meeting with
Petitioner, Mr. Felshaw King, and Retirement Office employees Marcia Stroud
and Chris Blevins, Retirement Office personnel again made clear to Petitioner that
the Retirement Office could not give him more than one year of service credit per
fiscal or calendar year under the statute. See, HT 121.
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The Retirement Office Annual Statements claim the Petitioner has years of
service credit for each of his employers, but each specifically states that if you are
employed with two or more employers at the same time to contact the Retirement
Office. Given Petitioner's situation with employment with two employers, he
could not reasonably add the service credit on the Annual Statements.
Petitioner also failed to do anything in reliance on the Board's statements.
Petitioner testified that he has not terminated his employment, and he has not
retired. See, HT at 151. Petitioner's sole claim of reliance was his speculation that
he may have quit his state positions and taken another job. However, Petitioner did
not provide any specific information as to whom the employer would have been,
how much money he would have made, whether jobs were available or whether he
was qualified to take such position.

Thus, Petitioner failed to allege any actual

reasonable reliance on the Retirement Office's statements, particularly in light of
the Retirement Office's consistent specific statements that Petitioner could not
receive more than one year of service credit for one year of actual work.
Finally, Petitioner failed to prove harm based on the Retirement Office
statements. The final element of estoppel is injury to the second party that would
result from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement,
admission, act or failure to act. Even after the hearing, it remains unclear whether

23

Although Petitioner made a vague reference that he would have made $3000
more per year at a new job, he would have lost his benefits. Given the amount of
potential retirement benefits he probably was better off financially staying with the
State.
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Petitioner has even made any claim for injury or damages at all - having only
requested that he be able to retire with 30 years of service credit. The Court has
held that in estoppel cases, "it is also a general rule of long standing that a plaintiff
must show damages by evidence of facts and not by mere conclusions, and that the
items of damage must be established by substantial evidence and not by
conjecture." Highland Constr. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Utah
1984)(internal citations omitted). Here, at best, Petitioner only offers conjecture.
Based on his age and years of service credit, Petitioner is not currently
entitled to a retirement benefit. Petitioner simply cannot prove any harm based on
the information the Retirement Office provided him, such as terminating his
employment. In fact, Petitioner remained employed, earning additional money
and service credit completely offsetting any speculative losses. Because any
allegation of losses are mere conjecture and not established by any substantial
evidence, Petitioner failed to prove any harm to him caused by the Retirement
Office.
In sum, Petitioner cannot prevail against the Board in an estoppel claim.
The Court in O 'Keefe clearly stated that knowledge of a reduction in benefits prior
to retirement "does not rise to the level necessary to prevail against a state
agency." O'Keefe, 929 P.2d at 1117. Because Petitioner cannot prove reasonable
reliance, or injury based on Retirement Office statements, he cannot make a
successful estoppel claim against the Board.
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IV.

PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT THAT HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO JUDICIAL
REVIEW BY THIS COURT WAS ABRIDGED DUE TO A MALFUNCTION IN THE
RECORDING OF THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS MOOT.

The Board granted Petitioner the procedural rights of notice and
opportunity to be heard. Yet, Petitioner argues that his due process right to
judicial review by this Court has been abridged because the recording of the
evidentiary hearing was interrupted due to a malfunction of the tape recorder. On
May 24, 2007, a supplemental hearing was held before the AHO for the specific
purpose of questioning Judy Lund, URS's Retirement Director. Petitioner
appeared as well as counsel. Petitioner's counsel was given ample opportunity to
question Judy Lund. Upon conclusion of that hearing, Petitioner's counsel and
counsel for the Board entered into a stipulation that the record on appeal be
supplemented with the transcript from the May 24, 2007 hearing. On June 7,
2007, the Utah Court of Appeals entered an Order stating that "The record on
appeal shall be supplemented with the May 24, 2007, hearing." Because the
record has been supplemented with the testimony of Judy Lund Petitioner's
argument regarding his denial of due process is moot and he has received his right
to due process.

V.

T H E BOARD'S ORDER ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED PETITIONER'S CLAIM OF
ESTOPPEL IN ITS FINDING OF FACTS, AND THUS PETITIONER'S DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS HAVE NOT BEEN VIOLATED,

The Board made sufficient findings of fact to support its conclusion of law
regarding estoppel that "Therefore, there are insufficient grounds to support an
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estoppel against the Board." HRat375. Petitioner claims that because his 24
proposed findings of fact were not adopted by the Board in its Order, the Order's
Findings of Fact are insufficient regarding its denial of Petitioner's estoppel claim.
See, Petitioner's Brief at 52. The Utah Supreme Court has found that, "it is
essential that [an administrative body] make subsidiary findings in sufficient detail
that the critical subordinate factual issues are highlighted and resolved in such a
fashion as to demonstrate that there is a logical and legal basis . . .." Milne Truck
Lines v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986). The Board's
Order sufficiently provides both the logical and legal basis for its determination
regarding Petitioner's estoppel claim. The Order's Findings of Fact regarding
Petitioner's estoppel claim states:
8. The following or a similar notification was contained on every
annual statement sent out by the Retirement Office, "If you are a
member in more than one Retirement System, if you are a part-time
elected or appointed official, or if you are employed with two or
more employers at the same time, you will need to contact the
Retirement Office."
9. Petitioner testified that in or about October 2003, he contacted the
Retirement Office to request a retirement estimate. In November 2003, he
received the retirement estimate notifying him that as of May 16, 2006,
assuming continued full-time employment, he would have a total of 17.087
years of service credit.
10. Marcia Stroud, Retirement Advisor for the Retirement Office, testified
that on August 29, 2005, at Petitioner's request, she sent Petitioner a new
retirement benefit estimate showing the calculation of Petitioner's
retirement service credit. Different from the 2003 estimate, this estimate
included a three-year service credit purchase for military service. The
estimate showed that on May 16, 2006, assuming continued full-time
employment, Petitioner would have 20.087 years of service credit.
11. Petitioner testified that on November 2, 2005, in a meeting with
himself, Mr. Felshaw King, and Retirement Office employees Marcia
Stroud and Chris B levins, the Retirement Office clearly explained to
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Petitioner that he was not eligible for more than one year of service credit
for one fiscal or calendar year of work.
12. Petitioner testified that he has not retired or terminated his employment
with either the State or the City.
13. Petitioner testified that had he known in 1994 that he could not count
toward his retirement two years of service credit for each year that he
worked for two employers, he would have accepted another position with
West Point City, would have resigned has job with the State, and would
have gone back to work in the construction industry with his brother as an
appraiser and would have earned about $3,000 more per year. Petitioner
provided no other evidence that he sustained injury or harm due to his
reliance on the Retirement Office's annual statements.

HR at 371-373.
Petitioner points to no reason why these findings are insufficient or
incorrect. These findings clearly support the Board's decision to deny Petitioner's
estoppel claims. The fact that the hearing officer failed to adopt Petitioner's
proposed findings of fact does not make the facts adopted insufficient. It merely
means the hearing officer either did not believe those facts, or they were not
relevant to his decision. Hence, because the Board's Order's Findings of Fact
provide a logical basis for its denial of Petitioner's estoppel claim, Petitioner's due
process claims have not been violated.

CONCLUSION
The Board hereby asks this Court to reject Petitioner's appeal in its entirety.
The Board correctly applied the plain language of LLC. A. §49-1 l-401(3)(c) and (e)
which mandate that a retirement system member cannot receive more than one
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year of service credit for one year of actual work. In addition, the Board correctly
found that Petitioner cannot purchase service credit under U.C .A. §49-11-403(1 )(d)
because he has no forfeited service credit. Furthermore, the Board correctly
denied Petitioner's claim for equitable estoppel against the Board as a government
agency because he failed to show either an unusual circumstance or that he
reasonably relied on the Board's statements to his detriment. Finally, the Board
asks this Court to deny Petitioner's claim of denial of due process based on the
Board's Order's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law because the Order
provides a logical basis for its denial of Petitioner's equitable estoppel claim.

DATED this

(/p-

day of

tp^S—

, 2007.

Howard, Phillips & Andersen
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to Phillip W. Dyer and Carey A. Seager
Attorneys for Petitioner at 221 Kearns Building, 136 South Main Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84101 on this the

7 . 7 . day of

^u^-t

2007.
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ADDENDUM "A"

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD

:
:
:
:

AMENDED
RECOMMENDED
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER

UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD,

:

File #: 06-03R
Hearing Officer: Howe

Respondent

:

NORMAN 0. WHITAKER,
Petitioner,
v.

A hearing was held on June 14, 2006, before the Adjudicative Hearing Officer on
Petitioner's Request for Board Action. Norman O. Whitaker ("Petitioner") was present and
represented by Phillip W. Dyer and Carey A. Seager.

The Utah State Retirement Board

("Board") was represented by David B. Hansen. Based upon the evidence in this matter and the
legal memoranda submitted, the Adjudicative Hearing Officer issued his Ruling dated August
15, 2006. The Adjudicative Hearing Officer now makes the following Recommended Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioner is a member of the Public Employees Non-Contributory Retirement System

("PERS") due to his employment with the State of Utah ("State") and West Point City ("City").
Petitioner is also a member of the Public Employees Contributory Retirement System due to his
previous employment with Davis and Weber County Canal Agency ("County").
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2.

PERS and PECRS are administered by the Utah State Retirement Office ("the Retirement

Office").
3.

Petitioner began working for the State on April 15, 1989, and is currently an active

employee.
4.

Petitioner began working for the City on January 1,1994, and is currently an active

employee.
5.

Petitioner was employed with the County from November 1,1989, through April 30,

1993. Petitioner worked for a total of 3.5 years for the County.
6.

On September 14, 2005, the Retirement Office, at Petitioner's request, sent Petitioner an

Estimate showing the calculation of his service credit. Petitioner's Estimate included a three
year military service purchase.
7.

The Retirement Office sends out annual statements to all members who have

contributions on record. The annual statements include total years worked for all participating
employers. For example, the statement sent out after the end of 2004 read in part as follows:
"SERVICE CREDIT PER SYSTEM AS OF DECEMBER 31,2004
CONTRIBUTORY LOCAL GOVERNMENT [1]
NONCONTRIBUTORY LOCAL GOVERNMENT [2]
NONCONTRIBUTORY STATE AND SCHOOL [2]

3.500 YEARS
10.834 YEARS
15.654 YEARS'5

"PLEASE EXAMINE THIS STATEMENT - If the balances shown on the accompanying
statement are not correct, please write promptly giving details of any differences to our auditors,
Deloitte & Touche, Attention: URS, 50 South Main Street, Suite 1800, Salt Lake City, UT
84144-0458, who are presently engaged in the regular examination of our financial statements.
Correspondence should include your name, Social Security number, and a copy of this statement.
If this statement is correct, no reply is necessary." (Emphasis in original).
8.

The following or a similar notification was contained on every annual statement sent out

by the Retirement Office, "If you are a member in more than one Retirement System, if you are a
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part-time elected or appointed official, or if you are employed with two or more employers at the
same time, you will need to contact the Retirement Office."
9.

Petitioner testified that in or about October 2003, he contacted the Retirement Office to

request a retirement estimate. In November 2003, he received the retirement estimate notifying
him that as of May 16, 2006, assuming continued full-time employment, he would have a total of
17.087 years of service credit.
10.

Marcia Stroud, Retirement Advisor for the Retirement Office, testified that on August 29,

2005, at Petitioner's request, she sent Petitioner a new retirement benefit estimate showing the
calculation of Petitioner's retirement service credit. Different from the 2003 estimate, this
estimate included a three-year service credit purchase for military service. The estimate showed
that on May 16, 2006, assuming continued full-time employment, Petitioner would have 20.087
years of service credit.
11.

Petitioner testified that on November 2, 2005, in a meeting with himself, Mr. Felshaw

King, and Retirement Office employees Marcia Stroud and Chris Blevins, the Retirement Office
clearly explained to Petitioner that he was not eligible for more than one year of service credit
for one fiscal or calendar year of work.
12.

Petitioner testified that he has not retired or terminated his employment with either the

State or the City.
13.

Petitioner testified that had he known in 1994 that he could not count toward his

retirement two years of service credit for each year that he worked for two employers, he would
have accepted another position with West Point City, would have resigned has job with the State,
and would have gone back to work in the construction industry with his brother as an appraiser
and would have earned about $3,000 more per year. Petitioner provided no other evidence that
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he sustained injury or harm due to his reliance on the Retirement Office's annual statements.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-613(4) places the burden of proof on Petitioner to prove that

pursuant to Utah law, he is entitled to over 30 years of service credit having performed only 17
years of actual work. Petitioner has not met this burden.
2.

Petitioner is precluded by Utah Code Ann. §49-11-401 (3) (c) and (e) from earning more

than one year of service credit in any one calendar or fiscal year. These statutory sections are not
ambiguous.
Utah Code Ann. §49-ll-401(3)(c) states,
The board shall fix the minimum time per day, per month, and per year
upon the basis of which one year of service an proportionate parts of a
year shall be credited toward qualification for retirement. Service may be
computed on a fiscal or calendar year basis and portions of years served
shall be accumulated and counted as service. In any event, all of the
service rendered in any one fiscal or calendar year may not count for more
than one year.
Section (c) does not contain any qualification or limitation. It provides that ".. .All of the service
rendered in any one fiscal or calendar year may not count for more than one year." This
language must be interpreted to mean "all service" rendered by a public employee in one year
whether to one or multiple employers.
In addition, Utah Code Ann. §49-ll-401(3)(e) also supports this interpretation stating, "A
member may not accrue more than one year of service credit per fiscal or calendar year as
determined by the office." This subsection contains no qualification or limitation that would
limit its application to one employer. It is immaterial whether the service is rendered to one
employer or multiple employers.
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3.

Petitioner is not entitled to purchase service credit under the provisions of Utah Code

Ann. § 49-11-403 because he has no forfeited service credit.
4.

All retirement contributions from all employers of the Petitioner received by the

Retirement Office will be used in calculating his retirement benefit at the time he retires.
5.

"As a general rule, estoppel may not be invoked against a governmental entity. In Utah,

there is a limited exception to this general principle for 'unusual circumstances' 'where it is plain
that the interests of justice so require.' This exception applies, however, only if'the facts may be
found with such certainty, and the injustice suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the
exception."' Anderson v. Public Service Comm % 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992)(citations
omitted).
6.

Even if Petitioner could have proven an "unusual circumstance" against the Board,

Petitioner failed to prove sufficient grounds to prevail on any claim for equitable estoppel against
the Board. The elements of equitable estoppel are:
(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by
one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2)
reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken on the
basis of the first party's statement, admission, act or failure
to act; and (3) injury to the second party that would result
from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such
statement, admission, act, or failure to act.
Hollandv. Career Service Review Bd.y 856 P.2d 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
7.

Although Petitioner misunderstood when he would be eligible to retire, the undisputed

facts do not give rise to an unusual circumstance to prevail on an estoppel claim against the
Retirement System. None of the annual statements gave Petitioner a "total" amount of his
service credit and each statement advised him to contact the Retirement Office if he was
employed by two or more employers at the same time. Because he failed to do so, his reliance
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on his interpretation of the amounts on the annual statements was not reasonable, and he did not
suffer any damage because of any reliance.
When Petitioner first contacted the Retirement Office in 2003, he was correctly told that
he would have 17.087 years of service credit as of May 16, 2006. Petitioner failed to contact the
Retirement Office again until September 2005 when he requested another estimate with a three
year military purchase. Petitioner was then told that he would have 20.087 years of service
credit as of May 16, 2006, if he made a military service purchase. Although Petitioner was
verbally informed in mid-October 2005 by a Retirement Office customer service representative
that he had over 31 years of "unverified" service credit, the Retirement Office quickly corrected
such a statement, and on November 2, 2006, the Retirement Office clearly informed Petitioner
that he could not receive more than one year of service credit for one year of actual work.
These facts do not rise to the level of an "unusual circumstance" to create an estoppel
against the Board as a governmental entity. Further, Petitioner proved no reasonable reliance
on the Board's statements, nor did he prove damages to prevail on a claim for estoppel against
the Board. Therefore, there are insufficient grounds to support an estoppel against the Board.

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner is not entitled to any relief in this proceeding.

BOARD RECONSIDERATION
Within ten (10) days of a Board order, any party may file a written request for
reconsideration stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested as set forth in Utah
Code Ann. §49-11-613. This filing for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial
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review of the order on review. The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the Board and
one copy sent by mail to each person making the request. The Board chairman or executive
director shall issue a written order granting or denying the request within twenty (20) days of
receipt. If no order is issued within twenty (20) days, the request is denied.

JUDICIAL REVIEW
If Petitioner is aggrieved with the final Board order, he may seek a judicial review within
thirty (30) days after the date that the order constituting final Board action is issued. Petitioner
shall name the Board and all other appropriate parties as respondents. The Utah Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final Board actions resulting from formal proceedings. All
petitioners shall follow the procedures established in Utah Code Ann.§ 63-46b-16.
DATED this cftf^day of October, 2006.

j^C^'^^J^)
Richard C. Howe
Adjudicative Hearing Officer
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The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Denial of the
Adjudicative Hearing Officer are hereby adopted as the order of the Utah State Retirement
Board.
Dated this ^*~ day of -October, 2006.
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD

BY
President
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this, \t> day of November 2006,1 mailed a
true and correct copy of the above Amended Recommended Findings of Facts, and
Conclusions of Law and Order, postage prepaid, to the following:
Phillip W. Dyer
221 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Mr. David Hansen
Howard, Phillips & Andersen
560 East 200 South #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

Debbie Buck
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